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Adding to the ongoing debate 
on how best to understand 
game theory and its relevance to 
economics, a response to 
Atanu Sengupta and Abhijit 
Ghosh’s “Non-cooperative 
Game Theory and Pay-off” 
(EPW, 28 January 2017).
In the article, “Non-cooperative Game Theory and Pay-off” (EPW, 28 Janu-ary 2017), Atanu Sengupta and Abhijit 
Ghosh question the contributions of game 
theory to economics. They do this by set-
ting up examples to show how game 
theory is case-specifi c, and thus cannot 
be generalised.
While we disagree with multiple 
asp ects of the paper, we will focus on 
two examples which are instrumental in 
the formulation of the authors’ argu-
ment. The fi rst part of this response crit-
ically evaluates these two problems and 
the second will discuss the relevance of 
game theory in economics.
Technical Problems
In their fi rst example, Sengupta and 
Ghosh attempt to show how the famous 
prisoner’s dilemma game applies only to 
the story of convicts. The prisoner’s dile-
mma game itself has been usefully 
 applied to other contexts such as under-
standing overuse of common pool re-
sources, pollution, lack of contribution 
to public goods, and other such situations, 
but that is beyond the purview of our 
current concerns. Even on their own ass-
umptions, their conclusions are mistaken.
Sengupta and Ghosh set up a game 
with two researchers who need to col-
laborate to fi nish a joint project. They 
claim that in a set-up such as this, the 
Nash equilibrium solution that the two 
researchers would not cooperate is hard 
to accept, as each researcher is aware 
that their non-cooperation would lead to 
their partner fi nding another researcher 
who would cooperate with them and 
“take away all gains.” Based on this set-up 
we have constructed a matrix shown in 
Table 1. 
Since we do not have any utility func-
tions to work with, we are assuming 
that the pay-off for both researchers 
 cooperating would be (6,6). If one re-
searcher cooperates and the other does 
not, in accordance with their set-up, the 
researcher that chooses to cooperate 
would fi nd another researcher and 
would receive a pay-off of 6, leaving the 
non-cooperator with a pay-off of zero. 
Lastly, both researchers not cooperating 
would result in both receiving no gains. 
The authors’ diffi culty in accepting 
that the researchers would choose to not 
cooperate is justifi ed, as it is simply not 
the Nash equilibrium. In fact, the game 
that they have proposed is not a prisoner’s 
dilemma game but rather an assurance 
game, where the Nash equilibrium is to 
cooperate–cooperate. Game theory never 
claimed to fi t all its varied situations 
into a prisoner’s dilemma framework 
and the stories behind popular game 
types exist not to constrict the game 
to that particular situation but as an 
explanatory tool.
However, Sengupta and Ghosh would 
have a problem with our set-up (Table 1) 
as we arbitrarily assigned cardinal values 
to the pay-offs. In their second example 
they try to show how despite maintain-
ing the order, a change in cardinal val-
ues can alter the Nash equilibrium. They 
do this by altering the pay-offs in the 
battle of sexes game (Table 2). The fun-
damental problem here is that they have 
not maintained the ordinal ranking be-
tween each strategy but rather within 
one strategy, namely, Bach–Bach. Doing 
this changes the entire meaning of the 
game. In the initial set-up (Table 3), the 
game is between two players who have 
confl icting preferences between listen-
ing to Bach and Stravinsky, but value 
Table 1: Researcher’s Dilemma
Player 1/Player 2 Cooperate Non-cooperate
Cooperate 6,6 (Nash) 6,0
Non-cooperate 0,6 0,0
Table 2: Sengupta and Ghosh’s Battle 
of the Sexes Game
Player 1/Player 2 Bach Stravinsky
Bach -3,-4 0,0
Stravinsky 0,0 1,2 (Nash)
Table 3: Battle of the Sexes Game
Player 1/Player 2 Bach Stravinsky
Bach 2,1 (Nash) 0,0
Stravinsky 0,0 1,2 (Nash)
DISCUSSION
JULY 29, 2017 vol lII no 30 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly144
listening to music together (thus, when 
one picks Bach and the other picks 
Stravinsky they both receive a pay-off of 
zero). In the authors’ modifi ed version of 
the game it would imply that both players 
value listening to Stravinsky more. In 
which case, the Nash equilibrium solution 
that they both will listen to Stravinsky is 
expected. If the goal was to keep the 
ordering the same, then the relative 
ordering between choosing Bach–Bach 
and Stravinsky–Stravinsky must be main-
tained and thus, the Nash equilibrium 
would remain unchanged.
Relevance to Economics
While there are multiple defi nitions of 
what economics is, one can agree with 
the broad understanding that economics 
studies how people interact with one an-
other and the world around them. Game 
theory thus is a tool to model how these 
social interactions take place. As is the 
case with any model in economics, it 
cannot represent the gamut of complex 
social interactions that take place in an 
economy and needs to be simplifi ed so 
that it can be understood. However, 
problems may arise when these assump-
tions are too unrealistic.
One such assumption is that all eco-
nomic agents are rational. Rationality in 
this context refers to individuals who 
are aware of their preferences and use 
this to make choices so as to optimise 
their preferences. Rationality here means 
completeness1 of preferences and transi-
tivity.2 Since humans have limited com-
putational capacities, it is unrealistic to 
assume that every individual can have a 
clear preference ordering for multiple 
commodities and asses how to maximise 
these sets of preferences optimally. An-
other assumption is that every individual 
is self-seeking and has no consideration 
for other agents and whose preferences 
are separate from them. This is simply 
not true in the real world, where indi-
vidual decisions are affected by society. 
Even within these restrictive ass u mp-
tions, game theory has been most suc-
cessfully applied in two situations. The 
fi rst being in understanding and thus 
designing auctions (as can be seen in 
Klemperer 2004) that governments use 
to allocate certain resources. The second 
is that of matching markets (Roth 2008a, 
2008b, 2015) which have novel uses, an 
extremely useful example being that of 
matching kidney donors to recipients. 
These uses themselves are a satisfactory 
argument to not dismiss the role of game 
theory, but to improve upon it and hope 
that it leads to more such  important 
 discoveries. 
The fi eld of game theory is nowhere 
close to stagnation and has been impro-
ving upon the neoclassical assumptions 
that governed its applications. For in-
stance, a simple fi x for the self-regarding 
assumption would be to use indifference 
curves that refl ect non homo-economicus 
behaviour like altruism, inequality aver-
sion and reciprocity. The question of 
 rationality can be dealt with in part with 
the more realistic concept of bounded 
rationality, in which there are bounds on 
the ability of people to take traditional 
“rational” decisions and where actions 
are based on heuristics. In addition to 
this there have been many extensions to 
game theory in the realm of experimental 
economics such as evolutionary game 
theory and neuro-economics based game 
theory. Both these approaches try to ex-
pand upon the understanding of human 
behaviour in the hope of arriving at a 
more realistic framework.
Do the problems in the assumptions 
that game theory make require it to be 
deemed irrelevant in the fi eld of eco-
nomics? We strongly disagree. Even if 
the real world applications of game 
theory are limited, game theory in eco-
nomics is still emerging, and the effect 
that it has had on the way we look at 
confl ict and think about social interac-
tions is  undeniable. 
Our view of the contributions of 
game theory in economics is best ex-
pressed in the words of Anatol Rapo-
port (1992: xii):
It is the shortcomings of game theory (as 
originally formulated) which force the con-
sideration of the role of ethics, of the dynam-
ics of social structure, and of social structure 
and of individual  psychology.
Notes
1  Given preferences A and B, completeness refers 
to the ability of a person to pick A, B or neither.
2  Given preferences A, B and C, transitivity 
refers to the consistency in preferences that a 
person is expected to maintain. For instance, if 
A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then 
A must be preferred to C.
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